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IN· MEMORIAM-JESSE W. CARTER
ttHe Died As He Lived-Fighting"
Jesse W. Carter died on March 15, 1959, at the age of seventy years.
His death was untimely because he was not old. Judge Carter was an ageless man who enjoyed excellent health until stricken with a heart attack in
February. He was vigorous and active, both physically and mentally. A
few days before the reverse which caused his death, he advised close friends
of his intention to return to the supreme court as soon as he convalesced
from his heart attack.
On the day of his passing, his son, Judge Oliver J. Carter of the federal
court, said to me, "He died as he lived, fighting." This was true ..
The background of the Justice reveals a continuous struggle over the
years of his life. Basically, Judge Carter was an advocate. This is in part
responsible for his great success as a practicing lawyer. It also accounts for
his strong decisions as a member of the Supreme Court of California.
Judge Carter was born in the mountains of Trinity County in a remote
part"of California. His father, a farmer and miner, had migrated to California from Iowa in the traqitional covered wagon. The family was large
and the means were most modest. At an early age, Judge Carter went to
work in the mines. He did not have a formal college education although he
was an extremely well read and literate man. He married and went to San
Francisco and worked for the street railroad. His sons, Oliver and Harlan,
were born in San Francisco, and his daughter, Marian, was born in Redding.
He elected to study law after his marriage. While working for the railroad, he became a student at the Golden Gate School of Law. Judge Carter
had tremendous capacity for work; he worked in the day time and attended
law school at IJight time. He committed the United States Constitution to
memory while working at a bench in the railroad shop.
It is commonplace to refer to one as a self-made man. Probably no one
more deservedly carries this appellation than Judge Carter. He studied law
under most adverse circumstances. His goal was achieved by reason of hard
work and sacrifice and with the assistance of his wife and family, who all
joined in his ambition to become a lawyer and shared in the sacrifices
necessary to accomplish his purpose.
Mter Judge Carter finished law school and was admitted to the bar, he
practiced law in San Francisco for a few months. He then moved to Redding in northern California in 1914 and opened a law office. He continuously practiced law in Redding from 1914 until his appointment to the
Supreme Court in 1939.
During his distinguished legal career, Judge Carter held various public
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offices. He was District Attorney of Shasta County for the two terms from
1918 and 1926. This was during the Prohibition era. While Shasta County
was of mining background and liberal in its social attitudes, the District
Attorney strictly enforced the unpopular liquor law. In those days the law
enforcement policy in small counties was pretty much determined by the
District Attorney. Judge Carter took the position that the law should be
enforced and it was. There was sharp division of thought on this among
the voters, and the "wets" waged a vigorous campaign to defeat him when
he ran for re-election. Carter won at the polls, however, by six votes, and
weathered an election contest in court when his margin was increased to
eleven votes.
As District Attorney, he vigorously enforced other laws pertaining to
county government. As advisor to the board of supervisors, he held illegal
a printing bill of a newspaper on the basis that one of the members of the
board held a chattel mortgage on the paper and that the contract was illegal
because of this conflict of interest. After protracted and bitter litigation,
the Supreme Court sustained the District Attorney.
Judge Carter always obtained great satisfaction from a remark made
by one of his political opponents concerning his conduct of the office of District Attorney. An out-of-town acquaintance asked a local citizen what kind
of a job Carter was doing as District Attorney. The reply was: "He is convicting the guilty, and making it damned hot for the innocent."
In 1922 Judge Carter commenced on behalf of a group of farmers a
series of lawsuits against the Pacific Gas and Electric Company over water
rights on the Pit River in Shasta County. The power company had diverted
the waters of the river for power uses. The cases were finally concluded in
1938. They were before the Supreme Court on many occasions and many
principles of riparian law were clarified and to some extent developed in
these cases. It was a source of great pride to the Judge that during all the
years of this litigation the original complaints filed by him never required
amendment or revision. With sixteen years of litigation, against the most
formidable lawyers in California, this lawyer from a small town was able
to sustain his original complaint in a most complex course of litigation. To
those who still feel that pleadings have an important office in framing and
defining legal issues, the pride of the Judge in his pleadings is quite understandable.
Without doubt Judge Carter was one of the finest trial lawyers in California. And this was so even though he practiced in a small community.
He had many cases of great import. As a lawyer he pioneered the way and
successfully advocated many new principles before the higher courts.
His knowledge of water law was outstanding. Likewise was his familiarity with the engineering and techniques of the use of water. In examining
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engineers he knew their language and could not be diverted by evasive
answers or inapplicable generalizations.
For many years Judge Carter served as city attorney for Mount Shasta
in Siskiyou County. This city was in great financial distress as a result of
an imprudent assessment bond issue. Over the years the Judge successfully
assisted in disposing of much of the financial problem, and on his appointment to the Supreme Court, the community was in a healthy condition and
has, since then, continued to improve.
As a lawyer, Judge Carter served as special counsel to several public
agencies. He conducted litigation on behalf of the City of Redding to sustain its right to own and operate its own water distribution system. Because
of certain federal questions involved, this litigation was not ended until the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. This cause serves as an
example of his ability and ingenuity in wholly unrelated fields of law. The
water company attacked the city in the state courts on the basis that the
bond issue proceedings were irregular; in the federal courts on the grounds
that a federal grant contravened the federal constitution; before a federal
administrative agency on the charge that the design of the proposed water
system was improper and unsound; and, before a state administrative
agency on the ground that the city should not be permitted to divert water
from the Sacramento River because the riparian rights of lower users would
be adversely affected. The capacity and resourcefulness of the Judge was
well demonstrated in his successful defense of the city's position before all
of the courts and agencies involved.
Among his other legal assignments was that of attorney for the State
Dental Board. Much of the early law pertaining to the jurisdiction and
authority of this board was developed in cases handled by the Judge as its
attorney. Among one attracting great public attention was the famous
"Painless Parker" case.
Likewise, he served on the board of governors of the State Bar in its
embryo years. He was most active in bar work and continued this interest
until his appointment to the court.
He contributed to his own community in many ways. He organized and
was the first president of the Redding Rotary Club. He was an honorary
member of this club at the time of his death.
He likewise initiated the movement to start the Boy Scouts in Redding.
In this work, he not only contributed financially, but he and Mrs. Carter
conducted trips to the mountains for the training and pleasure of the boys.
As a private citizen the Judge led a movement in Redding to acquire the
distribution system of the power company serving electrical energy to the
community. The matter was one of bitter controversy, but the community
ultimately took over the facilities and has operated them successfully ever
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since. Redding was the first city in California to utilize a special provision
of law authorizing the city to exercise a right of eminent domain in such
instances. The participation of the Judge in this program was consistent
with his belief in the right of people to exercise rights of ownership in the
public utility field, particularly where natural resources were used for production purposes.
Justice Carter possessed a fierce loyalty to his friends. This was not a
transitory feeling, nor was it dependent on continued close contact. Many
of his past associates have been, over the years, the beneficiaries of his devotion. It seemed that he enjoyed the successes of his former associates
even more than his own. He was completely unselfish in this respect.
A personal experience perhaps might be permitted. Shortly before his
appointment to the bench, the famous Pit River cases were finally completed and the payments in settlement were made. The total involved was
in the neighborhood of 350,000 dollars, which in 1938 was a substantial
sum of money, and certainly so for a small country office. In celebration,
the clients and others connected with the cases joined in a dinner party.
The writer had just completed his first jury case and, likewise, his first condemnation case. The jury was deliberating during the dinner and arrived
at its verdict while the dinner was under way. The issue in the case was
whether the state should pay sixty-two dollars for a right of way in accordance with its contentions, or 900 dollars as contended by the property owner
whom we represented, or some amount between these two figures. Youth
has its advantages in court, as elsewhere, and the jury brought in a verdict
of 850 dollars. On our return to the party the first to meet us at the door
was the Judge with an anxious inquiry concerning the result. On learning
of the verdict he immediately went into unrestrained and joyous laughter
for which he was famous. His praise was lavish, and he proudly announced
that the victory compared with the larger case, that only the figures were
different. This may seem unreal as written, but it is still accurate and factual. The Judge was not given particularly to direct praise and to a young
lawyer his expressions on this occasion were of great significance and pleasure. Twenty-five years later they are of greater importance.
In his earlier life the Judge was a student of literature and poetry. He
could quote at length from the works of many of the great poets and philosophers. Frequently, on late trips through the mountain areas of northern
California, he would entertain us with recitations from the works of the
literary men of the past. One of his favorites was Ingersoll. He could quote
almost everything he wrote. His favorite passage was:

May, 1959]

JESSE W. CARTER

357

Justice is the only worship.
Love is the only priest.
Ignorance is the only slavery.
Happiness is the only good.
The time to be happy is now.
The place to be happy is here.
The way to be happy is to make other people happy.
As a lawyer the Judge had a burning desire to be a member of the
Supreme Court of California. He considered this to be his ultimate goal.
In 1938 he was elected to the state senate at a special election. He served
here only until 1939 when Governor Culbert Olson appointed him to the
supreme court.
In keeping with tradition, however, even this was not without obstacles.
A provision of the state constitution forbids the appointment of a member
of the legislature to a non-elective state office. This provision had been used
to dissuade other members of the legislature on past occasions from accepting a court appointment. Some legal minds contended that the Supreme
Court was not an elective office because of the California system wherein
the voters only passed on whether the incumbent should be retained and
there were no other candidates on the ballot. The Judge met the issue and
accepted the appointment. By appropriate legal proceedings he established
the legal principle that the office was elective and that a member of the
legislature was eligible to receive the appointment. The Judge was seated
on the Supreme Court in 1939. His son Oliver succeeded him in the senate
as a result of another special election in the fifth senatorial district. Oliver
remained a member of the senate until his voluntary retirement in 1949.
He is now a distinguished judge of the United States District Court in San
Francisco. This is one of the few, if perhaps not the only instance in California history, of a father and son holding contemporaneously two of the
highest judicial positions in the state. Needless to say, the Judge was most
proud of the accomplishments of his son.
To many, Judge Carter, from a personal point of view, went onto the
court too soon. He was at the height of his career as a lawyer. Even though
he practiced in the country, he possessed a statewide reputation. There were
for him broad vistas ahead. He was comparatively young, being only fifty
years of age. He was much younger than his years and possessed boundless
energy with a great capacity for work.
He wanted to be a judge of the Supreme Court and financial considerations were unimportant to him. He was vigorous on the court and once he
determined as a judge how a case should be decided, he again became an
advocate to have his views adopted. On occasions, by expressing his disagreement with his associates, his language was strong and perhaps mis-
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understood. However, he always maintained a great respect and personal
affection for his associates on the court; perhaps even to a greater degree
than they realized.
There can be no doubt that the Judge on occasion was a severe victim
of nostalgia, and many believed that he yearned to return to the arena of
the courtroom. He was a warrior and it was most natural that he would
want to return to the battlefield. At the time of his passing he was formulating plans to retire from the court in about two years and re-enter practice on a limited basis.
One of the greatest attributes of the Judge from a professional point of
view was his interest in young lawyers. He took great pride in having a part
in the development of a young man. Many have benefitted from his guidance. Association with the Judge was no sinecure. As a practitioner he was
an extremely hard worker, and he put in many days at his office of twelve
hours or longer. He had an aptitude for bringing young men along to their
full capacity but without detailed direction. Results were the object, and
he did not believe in hand-feeding those working for him. However, he was
constantly abreast of the work in his office and he had an unusual faculty
of delegating as much responsibility as an apprentice could handle. He
expected the work to be done completely and without error. There was no
place in his life or office for indolence or mediocrity. The end product must
be first class and one that would stand the test in court. The details of performance were left to individual initiative and it irked him to be requested
to give constant direction. He was known on occasions to leave in a reasonably conspicuous place the Message to Garcia so that the young men could
read or reread it.
For one whose practice was always in a small community, it is believed
that the Judge has a fair amount of fruit to show for his work with young
men. There are three able judges now serving in various courts who were
formerly associated with him, namely, Judge Richard B. Eaton of the
Shasta County Superior Court, Judge Samuel F. Finley of the Del Norte
Superior Court, and his son Oliver of the United States District Court. In
addition, there are at least four reasonably successful lawyers who obtained
their original training in practice under his watchful eye.
The Judge possessed a great sense of humor and loved to exchange
yarns with his friends. He had a hearty laugh and he almost shook the rafters on occasion in reminiscing of experiences of the past. He always considered that the greatest compliment he ever received as a lawyer was from
a justice of the peace in a remote township in Siskiyou. This resulted in a
case in which he was defending a man of the mountains for allegedly taking
a deer out of season. It was a jury trial. The case of prosecution was weak,
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and on its conclusion the defendant's lawyer made a strong argument that
the court should dismiss the case without the necessity of the defendant's
producing evidence. The argument was concluded near noon time and the
motion of dismissal was denied by the court and a recess was taken until
afternoon for further evidence. When the justice of the peace left the bench
he passed the table of the defendant's lawyer. As he did, he whispered: "I
had a good mind to grant your motion, Mr. Carter, but I figured if I did
I would be deprived of the opportunity to hear your argument to the jury
and I don't want to miss that."
Judge Carter believed deeply in the rights of citizens and jealously resisted any unwarranted infringements of the liberties of people. Many of
his decisions on the Supreme Court reflect this philosophy It was not a new
one with him, nor was it one from which he ever deviated. He was completely dedicated to the view that governments often tend in the interests
of expediency to deprive people of their individual liberties. He was equally
dedicated to a constant alertness to and resistance of such practices. Some
of these matters perforce are of degree and admit of an honest difference of
opinion. The views of the Judge were honest, forthright and unyielding.
Those who would justify the means by the end to be accomplished and thus
whittle away private rights were consistently met at the threshold by the
Judge and resistance continued to the back door if necessary.
All of us are a little more secure in our rights and homes by reason of
the devotion of Judge Carter to our cause.
Daniel S. Carlton*

*A.B., 1931, Uruversity of Califorrua, LL.B., 1934, Uruversity of Califorrua. Member of
the California bar. Mr. Carlton was formerly assOCIated with Justice Carter m the practice of
law in Redding, California.

ffHe Never Declined to Do Battle for His Convictions"
The writer did not know Judge Carter personally, but a review of his
opinions in tort cases indicates that he was what is known as a "Jeffersonian
liberal," a "common law lawyer," a devout believer in jury trial, a zealous
and powerful advocate in behalf of the "underdog" usually identified ·by
him as a plaintiff. These characteristics are quite consistent with each other
and are exemplified throughout his judicial career by direct and rugged
statement that no one can misunderstand.
A Liberal

The term "liberal" is used in many senses. As applied to Judge Carter it
means respect for the rights of the individual, protection under law against
injuries inflicted upon him, and full recognition of his political rights. In
recent years the courts have been called upon to protect people against
oppressive legislation which denied them their political rights. The victims
of this legislation found a strong defender in Judge Carter. In Takahashi
1
'V. Fish and Game Comm'n his dissent would have struck down a statute
denying fishing rights to a certain class of aliens. In Sei Fujii 'V. California,2
concurring with the court in striking down an act denying Japanese aliens
the right to own land, he noted that Takahashi had been reversed by the
United States Supreme Court.3 In Gospel Army 'V. City of Los Angeles,4
he dissented from the court's decision upholding an ordinance requiring a
religious society to secure a permit and submit to certain regulations in
order to collect gifts of goods for distribution to the poor. In Perez 'V. Sharp6
he concurred with a majority of the court in striking down the state's antimiscegenation statute. In Danskin 'V. San Diego School Dist.6 he concurred
in the opinion of Judge Traynor denying the power of school authorities
to require a loyalty oath as a condition for the use of school buildings for
public meetings. Later he dissented in cases upholding loyalty oaths for
public employees,7 and in Haggerty 'V. Associated Farmers of California8
he dissented from the court's decision upholding an ordinance prohibiting
use of sound trucks on highways. Again in First Unitarian Church 'V.
County of Los Angeles9 he dissented from the court's decision sustaining
130 Ca1.2d 719, 185 P.2d 805 (1947).
238 Ca1.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
3 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
427 Cal.2d 232,163 P.2d 704 (1945), rev'd, 331 U.S. 543 (1947).
532 Ca1.2d 711,198 P.2d 17 (1948).
628 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
7Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 676, 249 P.2d 267 (1952).
844 Cal.2d 60, 279 P.2d 734 (1955).
948 Cal.2d 419, 311 P .2d 508 (1957).
[360 ]
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the requirement of a loyalty oath as a basis of tax exemption. A like dissent
is found in Speiser v. Randall.10 The decisions in both cases were subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.l l He concurred with the court in holding the Board of Education's action in firing
an instructor who took the fifth amendment in an inquiry concerning communist activities as lacking in due processP Judge Carter's dissent was on
the ground that the statute was unconstitutional.
His course of liberalism in the protection of other rights is as consistent
as in the area of political rights. His uncompromising attitude towards the
California "retraction" statute, in cases of libel by newspapers, is indicated
by dissents in Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers 13 and
Pridonoff v. Balokovich.14 His opinion in Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club,15
giving a person denied his rights under the California civil rights statute a
remedy by injunction as well as the penalty provided by statute, plus actual
and exemplary damages, has been of great value to other courts and has
met overwhelming professional approval.
Likewise his opinion in Luthringer v. Moore,16 holding the user of insecticides for extermination purposes liable to a person in another part of
the building for injuries suffered from the escaping poisons, has received
wide acclaim, extending as it does the highly commendable doctrine of
Green v. General Petroleum CorpP No less acceptable, no doubt, would
have been his opinion in Cole v. Rush18 holding a liquor dispenser liable
for injuries suffered by a wife on account of plying her husband with excess
drink, had the court not set its first decision aside and held to the contrary.1~
In this case all the rules of tort law pointed to liability, but the courts generally have denied liability on the basis that the drinking and not the selling
of the liquor was the proximate cause of the injury suffered. Of course this
is merely judicial camouflage for the undiscussed and important policies
which underlie the decision. In some types of cases courts refuse to discuss
the controlling policies, and here the policies are such that judges can hardly
be criticised for sticking closely to precedent, however weak it may be.
Judge Carter seldom hesitated to extend tort law to meet the emergencies of the case. He thought of legal doctrine as a means by which to accom10 48

Cal.2d 903, 311 P.2d 546 (1957).
Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles County, 357 U.S. 545 (1958) ; Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 (1958).
12 Board of Education v. Mass, 47 Cal.2d 494,304 P.2d 1015 (1956).
13 35 Cal.2d 121, 216 P .2d 825 (1950).
14 36 Cal.2d 788, 228 P.2d 6 (1951).
15 30 Cal.2d 110, 180 P.8d 321 (1947).
16 31 Cal.2d 489, 190 P.2d 1 (1948).
17 205 Cal. 328,270 Pac. 952 (1928).
18 271 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1954).
19 Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955).
11 First
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plish justice-protection of the victim against injury wrongfully inflicted
upon him. In Summers v. Tice 20 he exemplifies his great resourcefulness in
finding a way to meet legal doctrine that would have stopped most judges
in their tracks. Plaintiff, a companion of two other hunters who fired their
guns simultaneously at a bird, was hit in the eye with one shot. His companions were concededly negligent in shooting in the direction of plaintiff.
But whose shot hit him? Here was a simple but difficult question of causal
relation. Judge Carter found more than one way to hold either or both
defendants. Nothing other than a reading of the opinion can disclose his
masterly craftsmanship which commands the admiration of every torts
class in the country.
Summers v. Tice has an echo in subsequent cases. In Warner v. Santa
Catalina CO. 21 Judge Carter reversed a judgment of nonsuit in favor of the
manufacturer of cartridges used in a shooting gallery where plaintiff, a bystander, was struck in the eye by a particle of metal. The evidence was
meagre indeed on the issue of causal relation and on negligence, but in firearm cases Judge Carter adhered closely to the common law rule of strict
liability with the burden on the defendant to exculpate himself.22 He fully
developed his adherence to this theory in his separate opinion in Jensen v.
Minarfi23 in which the court transferred its early common law basis of liability in firearm cases to a negligence basis supported by res ipsa loquitur.
There is not too much difference in the ultimate results under either theory,
though Judge Carter's history is probably correct.
In Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System24 Judge Carter reduced
the test of infringement in the area of literary property to the reactions of
the average reasonable man upon the reading or examination of the two
productions. But his simple formula did not last,25 and in Desny v. Wilder o
he was greatly distressed by the "involved and confusing" process, as he
thought, the court had developed in dealing with infringement and related
problems. His liberal attitude toward the injured victim is demonstrated in
numerous other cases. His dissent would have extended a railroad's duty
to make search and render aid to an employee who had fallen from a train.27
He sought the expansion of workmen's compensation to cover wilful mis2033 Cal.2d 80,199 P.2d 1 (1948).
21 44 Ca1.2d 310,282 P.2d 12 (1955).
22 Tucker v. Lombardo, 47 Cal.2d 457,303 P.2d 1041 (1956).
23 44 Cal.2d 325, 282 P.2d 7 (1955).
24 35 Cal.2d 653, 221 P .2d 73 (1950).
25 See Burtis v. Universal Pictures Co., 40 Cal.2d 823, 256 P.2d 933 (1953); Kurlan v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 40 Cal.2d 799, 256 P.2d 962 (1953); Weitzenkom v. Lesser,
40 Cal.2d 778, 256 P.2d 947 (1953).
26 46 Cal.2d 715, 299 P.2d 257 (1956).
27 Anderson v. A.T.& S.F. Ry., 31 Cal.2d 117, 187 P.2d 729 (1947), rev'd, 333 U.S. 821
(1948).

L.J.214 (1958).

364

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

open every case that comes to court. Moreover he had developed great facility in using the weapons of the law, stroke and counter stroke. This knowledge and facility gave him remarkable powers as an advocate. His advocacy
breathes the atmosphere of the trial court, a sense of outrage at the injustice done his client. From no other source could he have acquired the strong
words of his dissenting opinions. In the Supreme Court when he had made
up his mind as to the justness of the cause, his advocacy for the position
he took assumed all the color of his trial experience. Apparently he had no
greater joy than springing to the kill of some error he found in the opposing
position. He was no mere jabber; he swung with all his might.
Perhaps Judge Carter would be considered a plaintiff's judge, an advocate for the underdog. In part this was no doubt due to his liberal philosophy. But there was a deeper base. As a student of the common law he knew
that the early history of tort law was based on the principle that one who
hurts another should compensate him for his hurt. He knew that during the
great era of the industrial revolution this principle was greatly modified
through the development of the law of negligence. 3s He knew and had witnessed the reaction to the weakness of negligence law which set in during
the late 1800s and the accelerated speed it has attained in recent years, resulting in the modification of negligence law and, in many instances, in the
sweeping away of the numerous immunities under which wrongdoers escaped liability to their victims. This reaction accorded with his liberal
philosophy and he himself, as practitioner and judge, labored mightily to
remold negligence law to meet the urgencies created by the dangerous activities and machines of modern life.
Judge Carter came to know that the rules of procedure and refinements
of negligence law, as is true in equity, are designed to the ends of justice
and not to defeat justice. His keen mind made him realize that no rule of
tort law could decide any case where the facts were complicated or in dispute. He learned from experience that the facts of a case are of the highest
importance and that their alignment and interpretation by trial judge, jury
and appellate court are the controlling factors in nearly every case. It was
thus that in writing for the court, in concurring and in dissenting opinions,
he so patiently and thoroughly regimented the facts of a case and sought to
bring his interpretation of the facts under some theory, rule or practice
that supported what he considered the just decision. This attitude toward
facts made him place great reliance on the verdicts of juries. He was at war
with doctrinal refinements which permit a trial judge to control juries by
surreptitiously charging on the weight of evidence under guise of stating a
rule of law, and which are as frequently used by appellate courts to sap the
functions of the trial judge and jury. Perhaps Judge Carter's devotion to
38 See GREEN, TRAFFIc VICTIMS: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE (1958).
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jury trial is the most pronounced phase of his judicial performance. Of his
contemporaries doubtless only Mr. Justice Black has a place with him in
the top bracket of reverence for jury trial. His loyalty to it as an institution seemingly never faltered or lost its edge.
In scores of cases Judge Carter argues for the rule of "reasonable
minds" as one for the jury, and against the trial or appellate court's taking
over the jury's functions. 39 His advocacy seems to reach its peak in sustaining a verdict, whether for plaintiff or defendant.40 His resourcefulness
in argument is indeed remarkable.41 Even though he agreed with the decision of the majority he seldom passed the opportunity to set forth his
views if he disagreed with their reasoning.42 The weight to be given the violation of a traffic statute or ordinance in negligence cases has given courts
everywhere much trouble. The California courts are no exception. Judge
Carter's common law breeding apparently influenced him to insist that the
violation of a statute should be tested by the conduct of a person of ordinary prudence, as determined by a jury.43 Incidentally, in recent years
courts generally are turning in this direction. Judge Carter, concurring in
the dissent of Judge Spence, thought this to be the test in the case of leaving
the key in the ignition of a car.44
Res Ipsa Loquitur

It is doubtful that any other court has accorded res ipsa loquitur SO
much importance as has the California court. The well known Ybarra 415
and Dierman46 cases, together with the more recent attempt to stabilize the
doctrine in Burr v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 47 have made the doctrine an im89 Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal.2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955) j Callahan v. Gray, 44 Cal.2d
107, 279 P.2d 963 (1955) j Shoemaker v. WIlsey, 43 Cal.2d 686, 277 P.2d 17 (1954) j Gray v.
Brinkerhoff, 41 Cal.2d 180, 258 P.2d 834 (1953) j Goodman v. Harris, 40 Cal.2d 254, 253 P.2d
447 (1953) j Pirkle v. Oakdale Union Grammar School Dist., 40 Cal.2d 207, 253 P.2d 1 (1953).
40 Kircher v. A.T.& S.F. Ry., 32 Cal.2d 176, 195 P.2d 427 (1948) j Rice v. California
Lutheran Hosp., 27 Cal.2d 296, 163 P.2d 860 (1955) j Kirk v. Los Angeles Ry., 26 CaI.2d 833,
161 P.2d 673 (1945) j Polk v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.2d 519,159 P.2d 931 (1945).
41 Hilyar Union Ice Co., 45 CaI.2d 30,286 P.2d 21 (1955) j Austin v. Riverside Portland
Cement Co., 44 Cal.2d 225, 282 P.2d 69 (1955) j Barrett v. City of Claremont, 41 CaI.2d 70,
256 P.2d 977 (1953) j Brokaw v. BIack-Foxe Military Institute, 37 Cal.2d 274, 231 P.2d 816
(1951) j Finnegan v. Royalty Realty Co., 35 CaI.2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 (1950) j Moore v. Belt,
34 Ca1.2d 525,212 P.2d 509 (1949).
42 Clement v. St.'lte Reclamation Board, 35 Cal.2d 628, 220 P.2d 897 (1950) j Sebrell v.
Los Angeles Ry., 31 Cal.2d 813, 192 P.2d 898 (1948) j Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal.2d 1, 187 P.2d
752 (1947) j Combs v. Los Angeles Ry., 29 Cal.2d 606,177 P.2d 293 (1947).
4SM&M Livestock Transp. v. California Auto Transp. Co., 43 Ca1.2d 847, 279 P.2d 13
(1955) j Saterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Ca1.2d 581,177 P.2d 279 (1947).
44 Richards v. Stanley, 43 CaI.2d 60, 271 P .2d 23 (1954).
45 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486,154 P.2d 687 (1944).
46 Dierman v. Providence Hosp., 31 Cal.2d 290, 188 P.2d 12 (1947).
4142 Cal.2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
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portant factor in many cases. It was a favorite with Judge Carter, and with
his great ability to analyze the facts he could sustain the plaintiff's case in
many instances where the court found the doctrine either not available or
else overcome by countervailing evidence. These cases must have raised
Judge Carter's blood pressure for his aruments supporting jury determination of the issue were frequently throbbing with outrage.48 They indicate
how difficult it is to give res ipsa loquitur a uniform meaning, even procedurally in every case, and no one thinks it can be given a uniform weight
substantively. The attempt to do either requires nice refinements and
sooner or later results in confusion.
Circumstantial evidence must necessarily vary in weight in different
cases and this applies as well to circumstantial evidence characterized as
res ipsa loquitur. The same is true or should be true of its procedural effect.
The same phenomena are found in the weight and procedural effect to be
given the violation of a statute or ordinance. Calling such violation negligence per se only involves a court in deeper trouble. Res ipsa loquitur and
negligence per se are in fact twin doctrines, one operating in the common
law field, the other in the statutory field. The violation of a statute also
speaks for itself. But what does it say? In one case it may merely whisper
while in another it may scream, as is true of res ipsa loquitur. But in every
such case of common law or statutory negligence there are other facts which
are not spoken by the mere happening. It is becoming quite common to
treat statutory violations as res ipsa loquitur cases, and this gives point to
Judge Carter's testing of statutory violations by the common law rule of
negligence. The law would not lose much if both doctrines were thrown
overboard, as the courts could deal with the situations characterized by
both doctrines under their common law powers. But there is no likelihood
that the doctrines will be thrown into discard: This may be speaking too
quickly. The California court, in the recent case of Brandelius v. City and
County of San Francisco,49 has discarded the false doctrine of "unavoid48 Trust v. Arden Farms, 50 Ca1.2d 217, 324 P.2d 583 (1958) (broken milk bottIe) ; Phillips
v. Noble, 50 Cal.2d 163, 323 P.2d 385 (1958) (majority held that "happening of accident no
evidence of negligence" instruction not inconsistent with res ipsa loquitur when no instruction
requested, but would be inconsistent if res ipsa loquitur arose as a matter of law) ; Barrera v.
De La Torre, 48 Ca1.2d 166, 308 P.2d 724 (1957) (car crossed curb into plaintiff's house;
P did not request instruction on res ipsa loquitur, and charge of presumption of no negligence
given for the defendant); Danner v. Atkins, 47 CaI.2d 327, 303 P.2d 724 (1956) (truck rolled
into plaintiff's cafe); Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hosp., 47 Cal.2d 509, 305 P.2d 36
(1956) (inference overcome by testimony of adverse witness under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 2055); Simmons v. Rhodes & Jameison, Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 293 P.2d 26 (1956) (burns resulting from cement) ; Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955); Farber v. Olkon,
40 CaI.2d 503, 254 P.2d 520 (1953) (res ipsa loquitur not available to mental patient injured
while under electric shock treatment).
49 47 Cal.2d 729, 306 P.2d 432 (1957).
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able accident," as was protested by Judge Carter in Parker v. Womack. 50
It has also had less and less to say about proximate cause, sole cause and
other "causes," equally false issues, since the celebrated case of Mosley v.
Arden Farms. 51 If some pages could be torn out of the Book of Approved
Jury Instructions further progress in this direction might be made, and,
with a few more lectures like that of Judge Shinn in Werkman v. Howard
Zinc Corp.52 the progress would be accelerated.
The recent case of Alarid v. Vanier5 3 deserves special attention. There
defendant rammed plaintiff's automobile from the rear. The operation of
defendant's car was in violation of statute. The collision was characterized
as a res ipsa loquitur situation. In the suit brought by plaintiff the trial
court gave the discarded "unavoidable accident" instruction, and the
"mere-happening-of -the-accident-no-evidence-of-negligence" instruction,
even though it is error to give such an instruction in a res ipsa loquitur case.
The jury found for defendant. The court reviewed the violation of statutes
cases and held the true rule to be: 54
In our opinion the correct test is whether the person who has violated a
statute has sustained the burden of showing that he did what might reason'"
ably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar
circumstances, who desired to comply with the law.

This test of course does much to moderate the negligence per se doctrine.
The court held that the erroneous instructions were non-prejudicial or
harmless, despite the strong dissents of Judges Carter and Shenk. The case
is a remarkable example of how American appellate courts have succeeded
in developing practices that permit them to take the administration of justice in their own hands. It may well be that even though jury trial is not
discarded in American courts, in civil cases, as is largely the case in all other
common law jurisdictions, we may arrive at the same result through the
growth of appellate power to control jury verdicts.
'
Last Clear Chance
Judge Carter was jealous in protecting the last clear chance doctrine.
He was counsel in Girdner v. Union Oil CO./,5 one of the leading cases of
the country if its facts be considered and its struggle to make the case rest
upon proximate and remote cause be disregarded. It is very strange how
clearly the court states the last clear chance rule in the early part of its
50 37 Cal.2d 116, 230 P.2d 823 (1951).
51 26 Cal.2d 213, 157 P.2d 372 (1945).
52 97 Cal. App.2d 418,218 P.2d 43 (1950).
53 50 Cal.2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958); c/. Laird v. T. W. Mather, Inc., 51 Ca1.2d. ..- .
331 P.2d 617 (1958).
54 Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal.2d 617, 624,327 P.2d 897, 900 (1958).
55216 Cal. 197, 13 P.2d 915 (1932).
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opinion and then again in the concluding part. Says the court: "The rule of
the last clear chance means just what the words imply." Truly a doctrine
based on time sequence too simple to be misunderstood I But the court was
not satisfied with so simple an answer. It says: "The real issue in cases of
the character here involved is not whose negligence came first or last, but
whose negligence, however it cam~, was the proximate cause of the injury."
Then the payoff: "The real question to be determined in considering cases
of the chartacter of the one here involved is whether or not the so-called
continuing negligence is the proximate or remote cause of the injury, which
question is determined by the application of the principles of the doctrine
of the last clear chance itself." Why bother about proximate and remote
cause if they in turn have to be determined by the last clear chance? The
court's statement of last clear chance leaves nothing to be added. 'Why were
not the court and subsequent courts satisfied with this simple and understandable statement? If we could answer that question we could say with
the poet, "we know what God and man is."
Judge Carter seldom had his way about the application of the doctrine. 56
In Brandelius v. City and County of San Francisco the court affirmed the
trial court's granting of a new trial for minor defects in the instructions.
The court thought that the rule as stated in Girdner, after being cuffed
around for so many years, needed clarification. Judge Carter rejected the
clarification as confusing and full of inconsistencies. The pride of craftmanship no doubt had some effect on his judgment, but it may be that the restatement of the rule, as is the case with most restatements, will simply be
a point of departure for other refinements of the rule as restated. The more
recent case of Garibaldi v. Borchers Bros.57 seems to bear out this observation. There the court says:5S
Before concluding this phase of the discussion we should state that it appears that any instruction, such as BAJI 20S-A, Third Paragraph, is technical in nature and is of little, if any, assistance to the average jury in
applying the last clear chance doctrine. It would be more helpful, in our
opinion, if the courts would frankly recognize that the last clear chance
doctrine is in reality an exception to, or modification of, the ordinary rules
making plaintiff's contributory negligence a bar to plaintiff's recovery.

Then the court proceeds to add to this very sensible statement the confusing talk of proximate cause. Of course there must be causal relation
about which there is usually no doubt, but "proximate cause" in this context does not mean causal relation. If there is doubt about causal relation
56 Doran v. City and County of San Francisco, 44 Cal.2d 477,283 P.2d 1 (1955); Sparks
v. Redinger, 44 Ca1.2d 121,279 P.2d 971 (1955); Daniels v. City and County of San Francisco,
40 Cal.2d 614, 255 P.2d 785 (1953); Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Ca1.2d 290,246 P.2d 663 (1952);
Selinsky v. Olsen, 38 Ca1.2d 102, 237 P.2d 645 (1951).
1i748 Ca1.2d 283, 309 P.2d 23 (1957).
lisld. at 290, 309 P.2d at 27.
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it should be submitted to the jury as a separate issue and not be permitted
to confuse the simple and easily understood concept of last clear chance.
And it must in fairness be said that the court as indicated by the last sentence in the paragraph from which the quotation is taken is so inclined.
Both the last clear chance and causal connection are fact inquiries, but for
clarity they should be kept separate. Suffice it to say that Judge Carter was
very distressed by the continued restrictive process in the applications of
the last clear chance doctrine and repeated what he had said in Brandelius.
This much may be added: The court put its finger on the significance
of the last clear chance doctrine when it said the doctrine is simply a modification of the contributory negligence doctrine, the harshest doctrine of
the common law. At times contributory negligence has represented a sort of
sanctified harshness. Three rather recent cases of the New York Court of
Appeals indicate how that court has swung away from the letter of the last
clear chance rule to the spirit of the rule.59
Any adequate evaluation of Judge Carter's contribution to tort law
would be impossible in so brief a study and at this time. This will have to
await the further development of tort law. It may be, as has been true of
other great common law judges, that Judge Carter will only gain his full
stature after death. As indicated by the volume of his output and its clarity
of thought content, he gave all he had to his work. But what he contributed
is so much a part of tort law as shaped by the whole court that his full influence in its shaping can never be known. The opinions he wrote were necessarily influenced by his fellow judges as were those they wrote influenced
by him. The impression is gained from the development of tort law during
his tenure that Judge Carter served as a stimulant to his brother judges to
do their best. They knew they had to be prepared to meet his arguments,
for no one can say he ever declined to do battIe for his convictions. And
no doubt the freedom to dissent which he asserted influenced his able associates to do likewise, for the reports of no other state court disclose so
many dissents. Moreover, they do not seem to follow any pattern except
the individual views of the dissenters. A free court makes for a jurisprudence robust with justice. And this must be added. During Judge Carter's
tenure the court has become the leading court of the country in tort law.
Being an able and experienced lawyer in this broad field of general law
he must have had a large share in bringing the California court to this
preeminence.
Leon Green*
59 Kunkumian v. City of New York, 305 N.Y. 167, 111 N.E.2d 865 (1953); Chadwick v.
City of New York, 301 N.Y. 176,93 N.E.2d 625 (1950). Ct. Panarese v. Union Ry., 261 N.Y.
233,185 N.E. 84 (1933).
* B.A., 1908, Ouachita College; LL.B., 1915, University of Texas; LL.D., 1938, Louisiana
State University. Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law. Member
of the Connecticut, Texas, and Dlinois Bars.

